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ENFORCING MANDATORY ARBITRATION
CLAUSES IN EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS: A
COMMON SENSE APPROACH TO THE
FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT'S SECTION 1
EXCLUSION
I. INTRODUCTION
With litigation costs steadily rising1 and the number of
employment-related lawsuits increasing,2 employers and the
judiciary are continuously seeking to resolve employment dis-
putes in alternative forums.' Renewed concern about the ad-
equacy and fairness of arbitration in disputes involving pri-
vate (nonunion) arbitration agreements in employment
contracts4 has caused some courts and commentators to re-
examine the use of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)' to en-
force such agreements.
Chief amongst such concerns and most controversial is
the FAA's exclusion of "contracts of employment of seamen,
railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in
1. See, e.g., Jorge Aquino, ADR at Work: If It's Forced Is It Fair?, RE-
CORDER, July 20, 1994, at 1.
2. In 1994, the number of employment cases filed in federal court rose by
23%. Rodney Glover & Attison Barnes, Arbitrating Employment Disputes; How
Far Gilmer Goes Remains Unclear, LEGAL TIMES, May 29, 1995, at S27. In the
last 20 years, the number of employment cases filed in federal court has risen
2166%. Id. In the first 12 months following the enactment of the Civil Rights
Act, employment discrimination claims fied in federal courts rose by 29%. 1992
ANN. REP. OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS. 182 (Table C-
2A). See Steven M. Kaufmann & John A. Chanin, Directing the Flood: The
Arbitration of Employment Claims, 10 LAB. LAW. 217, 217-18 (1994).
3. Kaufmann & Chanin, supra note 2, at 217-19.
4. This comment addresses the use of mandatory arbitration agreements
in private, individual employment contracts, such as those contained in con-
tracts entered into and negotiated by one individual nonunion party and his or
her employer. An example would be an employment contract between an em-
ployee who is a middle management sales director and an employer that is a
semiconductor manufacturer and distributor. This is different from a
mandatory arbitration agreement contained in a collective bargaining agree-
ment negotiated by a union on behalf of its members, such as an agreement
between a garment manufacturer and a textile workers union. That type of
agreement is not the subject of this comment.
5. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1988 & Supp. 11 1992).
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foreign or interstate commerce."6 Federal courts are split on
how to read this exception. If the courts read this exception
broadly, all contracts of employment would be exempted from
the auspices of the FAA.7 If read extremely narrowly, the
courts would limit the exemption to those actually engaged in
the transportation industry.' The United States Supreme
Court, in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,9 held en-
forceable a predispute agreement to arbitrate contained in a
securities registration application, 10 but refused to extend its
holding to arbitration agreements contained in employment
contracts.1 Since that decision, federal courts have re-
mained split on the application of the exception.
1 2
This comment begins by examining the FAA13 and the
relevant Supreme Court cases that have developed the policy
and general rules that are important to an understanding of
the problem.' 4 Second, this comment addresses the Gilmer
decision, which was the major turning point in this area,'5
before tracing the two major case lines that have developed
with respect to the FAA's exception.' 6 Finally, this comment
decides that a narrow reading of the exception is consistent
with the drafters' intent' 7 and proposes both that the FAA be
amended and that a practical solution be utilized in the
meantime.' 8
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Federal Arbitration Act and Its Legislative History
The FAA provides that "[a] written provision in ... a con-
tract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle
by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such
contract or transaction... shall be valid, irrevocable and en-
6. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1988) (emphasis added).
7. See infra part II.D.2.
8. See infra part II.D.1.
9. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
10. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 23.
11. Id. at 25 n.2.
12. See infra part II.D.
13. See infra part II.A.
14. See infra part II.B.
15. See infra part II.C.
16. See infra parts II.D.1, II.D.2.
17. See infra part IV.
18. See infra part V.
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forceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity
for the revocation of any contract." 19
The FAA serves a dual purpose. First, it reverses the
long-standing judicial hostility to arbitration agreements
that existed at English common law and was adopted by U.S.
courts.2" Second, it places arbitration agreements on the
same footing as other contracts.2 1 Section 2 of the FAA has
been viewed as a congressional declaration favoring a liberal
federal arbitration policy, notwithstanding any contrary state
procedural or substantive law of arbitrability.22 The effect of
the section is to create a body of federal substantive law of
arbitrability applicable to any arbitration agreement falling
within the parameters of the Act.23
Additionally, section 2 has been interpreted as assuring
those whose contracts relate to interstate commerce that
their expectations will not be undermined by federal judges,
state courts, or state legislatures.24 In creating a substantive
rule applicable in state and federal courts, Congress intended
to foreclose state legislative attempts to undermine the en-
forceability of arbitration agreements.25
The FAA's scope, however, is limited. Section 1 of the
FAA states that "nothing herein contained shall apply to con-
tracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any
other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate com-
merce."26 The legislative history concerning this section of
the FAA is sparse. In fact, one of the few references to the
section 1 exclusion appears in a report of the Bar Association
Committee.28 It states:
Objections to the bill were urged by Mr. Andrew Furuseth
as representing the Seamen's Union, Mr. Furuseth taking
19. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1988).
20. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991); see
also Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219-20 (1985); Scherk v.
Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 510 n.4 (1974).
21. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 24.
22. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24
(1983).
23. Id.
24. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 13 (1984).
25. Id. at 16.
26. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1988) (emphasis added).
27. Signal-Stat Corp. v. Local 475, 235 F.2d 298, 302 (2d Cir. 1956).
28. The Federal Arbitration Act was drafted by a committee of the Ameri-
can Bar Association. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 39 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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the position that seamen's wages came within admiralty
jurisdiction and should not be subject to an agreement to
arbitrate. In order to eliminate this opposition, the com-
mittee consented to an amendment to Section 1.29
In addition, at a hearing of the Senate Judiciary Commit-
tee, the chairperson of the ABA committee responsible for
drafting the bill said:
[This bill] is not intended [to] be an act referring to labor
disputes at all. It is purely an act to give the merchants
the right or privilege of sitting down and agreeing with
each other as to what their damages are, if they want to
do it. Now that is all there is in this.3 0
B. The Pre-Gilmer Supreme Court Case Line: Mitsubishi,
McMahon, and Rodriguez de Quijas
The pre-Gilmer Supreme Court case line established as
doctrine the Court's overwhelming policy in favor of arbitra-
tion. An understanding of this policy and rationale is essen-
tial to placing Gilmer and the section 1 case lines in the
proper context.
1. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth, Inc.
In Mitsubishi Motors Corp.,"1 the plaintiff automobile
manufacturer brought suit against defendant automobile
dealer for various breaches of a sales procedure agreement.3 2
The defendant counter-claimed for violations of various anti-
trust and unfair competition statutes.3 3 The specific issue in
Mitsubishi was the arbitrability, pursuant to the FAA,34 of
claims arising under the Sherman Act 5 and encompassed
within a valid arbitration clause in an agreement embodying
an international commercial transaction. 6 Defendant Soler
29. Tenney Eng'g v. United Elec. Workers, 207 F.2d 450, 452 (3d Cir. 1953)
(quoting 48 A.B.A. REP. 287 (1923)).
30. Hearings on S. 4213 and S. 4214 Before the Subcomm. on the Judiciary,
67th Cong., 4th Sess. 9 (1923).
31. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614
(1985).
32. Id. at 616-22.
33. Id. at 617-20.
34. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1988 & Supp. III 1992).
35. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1988 & Supp. I1 1991).
36. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 616.
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contended that the Court could not construe an arbitration
agreement so as to encompass claims arising out of statutes
designed to protect Soler's class unless the arbitration clause
specifically mentions such statutes. 7
The Court rejected this argument, relying in large part
on the policy surrounding the FAA.3 The Court stated that
it found "no warrant in the Arbitration Act for implying in
every contract within its ken a presumption against arbitra-
tion of statutory claims."3 9 Relying on the liberal federal pol-
icy favoring arbitration agreements 40 shown by section 2 of
the FAA,41 the Court said that at least this policy guarantees
the enforcement of private contractual agreements to arbi-
trate.4 2 That is, since Congress' main concern in passing the
Act was to enforce private arbitration agreements that par-
ties had entered, it is essential that this Court rigorously en-
force such agreements.43
The Court said that normal contract principles apply to
arbitration agreements. 44 Therefore, the parties' intentions
control, and those intentions are generously construed as to
issues of arbitrability.45 These principles still apply when the
party bound by the arbitration agreement raises claims based
on statutory rights.46 Mitsubishi is partly based upon the
Court's belief that "we are well past the time when judicial
suspicion of the desirability of arbitration and of the compe-
37. Id. at 624-25.
38. Id. at 625.
39. Id.
40. See Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S.
1, 24 (1983).
41. Specifically, § 2 provides that a written agreement to arbitrate "in any
maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving com-
merce . .. [is] valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1988).
42. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 625.
43. Id. at 626 (quoting Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213,
221 (1985)).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Mitsubishi held that the mere assertion of statutory rights, such as
those pertaining to the Sherman Act, Title VII, or the ADEA, does not alter the
principles behind enforcing arbitration agreements. Mitsubishi Motors Corp.,
473 U.S. at 628. By agreeing to arbitrate statutory rights, the party does not
forgo the substantive protection afforded by such statutes. Id. The party
merely consents to a different forum for their disposition. Id.
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tence of arbitral tribunals inhibited the development of arbi-
tration as an alternative means of dispute resolution."4 7
In keeping with these contract principles, the courts
should remain alert to any legitimate claims that the arbitra-
tion agreement was induced by the sort of fraud or over-
whelming economic power that would provide "grounds ...
for the revocation of any contract."48 If such grounds are
found in relation to the arbitration clause, the clause should
be declared void.49
The Court stressed that "[bly agreeing to arbitrate a stat-
utory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights af-
forded by the statute."50 The party is merely submitting to
the resolution of its claims in an arbitral rather than a judi-
cial forum. 51 If Congress wanted the substantive protection
afforded by a given statute to include protection against
waiver of the right to a judicial forum, that intention will be
deducible from the text or legislative history.5 2  "Having
made the bargain to arbitrate, the party should be held to it
unless Congress itself evinced an intention to preclude a
waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights at
issue.
In his dissent, Justice Stevens opined that the majority's
"assumption that arbitral processes are commensurate with
judicial processes and that Congress impliedly intended fed-
eral courts to defer to arbitral decisions on [antitrust issues]"
is unlikely.54 That is, Justice Stevens expressed doubts re-
garding the integrity of the arbitral system.5 5 Justice Ste-
47. Id. at 626-27.
48. Id. at 627 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1988)). See Southland Corp. v. Keating,
465 U.S. 1, 16 n.11 (1984); The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15
(1972). -
49. Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 627.
50. Id. at 628.
51. Id. What the parties are in effect doing is trading the procedures and
opportunity for review of the courtroom for the simplicity, informality, and
quickness of arbitration. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 648 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Ar-
bitral procedures, while well suited to the resolution of contractual disputes,
make arbitration a comparatively inappropriate forum for the final resolution of
rights created by Title VII.").
55. "T]he informal procedures which make arbitration so desirable in the
context of contractual disputes are inadequate to develop a record for appellate
review of statutory questions. Such review is essential on matters of statutory
564 [Vol. 36
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vens also said that nothing in the FAA, nor its legislative his-
tory, suggests that Congress intended to authorize the
arbitration of statutory claims.56
Mitsubishi established that federal statutory claims were
subject to mandatory arbitration clauses in a commercial con-
text.57 In Shearson /American Express, Inc. v. McMahon,5 8
the Court addressed the question of whether such claims
were subject to arbitration clauses between individuals and
securities brokers.59
2. Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon
In McMahon,6 ° the Court addressed whether claims
brought against a broker by its customers under the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 193461 and the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organization Act (RICO)62 must be arbitrated in ac-
cordance with the terms of an arbitration agreement.63
Relying on the same analysis of the strong federal policy
behind the FAA discussed in Mitsubishi,64 the McMahon
Court held that "[t]he Arbitration Act, standing alone ...
mandates enforcement of agreements to arbitrate statutory
claims."65 McMahon also agreed with Mitsubishi that a con-
trary congressional command in a statute may preclude en-
forcement of an agreement to arbitrate.66
In the securities claim, the Court refused to follow earlier
precedent that had held a similar provision unarbitrable. 7
The Court distinguished McMahon from the prior case be-
cause the Court denied the enforceability of arbitration on
the grounds that arbitration was not an adequate remedy to
interpretation in order to assure consistent application of important public
rights." Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting United States Bulk Carriers v.
Arguelles, 400 U.S. 351, 359-60 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
56. Justice Stevens stated that the FAA should apply exclusively to con-
tractual disputes such as breach of warranty, terms of payment, and time of
delivery of goods. Id. at 647 & n.11 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
57. Id. at 640.
58. 482 U.S. 220 (1987) [hereinafter McMahon].
59. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 222.
60. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
61. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988).
62. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
63. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 222.
64. See supra text accompanying notes 38-43.
65. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 226-27.
66. Id.
67. See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
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protect the substantive rights at issue.68 In light of the cur-
rent view of the adequacy of arbitration as a forum,69 the
Court held in McMahon that the antitrust claims here would
not effect a waiver of the protection of the Securities Ex-
change Act.v°
The RICO claim in McMahon was held to be arbitrable,
again based on the Court's reasoning in Mitsubishi.71 The
plaintiffs contended that the potential complexity of RICO
claims meant they were unfit for arbitration.72 Mitsubishi
had said that potential complexity should not suffice to ward
off arbitration, reasoning that the "adaptability and access to
expertise" characteristic of arbitration rebutted the view
"that an arbitral tribunal could not properly handle antitrust
matters."7 3 Finally, because there was no inherent conflict
between arbitration and the policies underlying RICO, 74
there was no basis for precluding arbitration.75
McMahon thus solidified the Court's current position in
favor of the arbitrability of federal statutory claims.76 The
last vestiges of the Court's doubt concerning arbitration were
disposed of in Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson /American Ex-
press, Inc.
77
3. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express,
Inc.
Rodriguez de Quijas involved an agreement between var-
ious investors and their broker to settle any controversies re-
68. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 228-34.
69. The current view is that the Federal Arbitration Act established a
strong federal policy favoring arbitration. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v.
Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
70. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 234.
71. Id. at 238-42.
72. Id. at 239.
73. Id. (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,
473 U.S. 614, 633-34 (1985)).
74. Id. at 239-42. The policing ftmction of RICO is secondary to the reme-
dial purpose. Id at 240-41. Although the same conduct under RICO can trigger
criminal prosecution as well as civil actions, the compensatory aspect of RICO's
treble damages provision reveals a primary intent to compensate the victims of
organized crime. Id. at 239-40. Since this primary objective can be achieved
through arbitration, there is nothing inconsistent between arbitration and the
policies underlying RICO. Id. at 242.
75. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 242.
76. Id.
77. 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
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lating to their accounts through binding arbitration. 78 The
investors sued the broker after their investments failed, al-
leging various state and federal claims including claims
under the Securities Act of 1933.79
Rodriguez de Quijas held that a predispute agreement to
arbitrate claims under the Securities Act of 1933 is enforcea-
ble, and resolution of the claims solely in a judicial forum is
not required.80 This explicitly overruled Wilko v. Swan."
The Court favored arbitration agreements because "they, like
the provision for concurrent jurisdiction [that exists in the
Securities Act], serve to advance the objective of allowing
[claimants] a broader right to select the forum for resolving
disputes, whether it be judicial or otherwise."8 2 In terms of
generalized attacks on arbitration based on "suspicion of ar-
bitration as a method of weakening the protections afforded
in the substantive law to would-be complainants," such an at-
tack "has fallen out of step with our current strong endorse-
ment of the federal statutes favoring this method of resolving
disputes."8 3
The Supreme Court had established its strong support
for arbitration as an adequate forum for the disposition of
statutory rights, and its recognition of the overwhelming fed-
eral policy in favor of arbitration in general.8 4 Against this
backdrop, the Court in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane
Corp.8 5 addressed the question of whether to enforce
mandatory arbitration of federal statutory claims in the em-
ployment context.8 6
78. Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 478.
79. Id. at 478-79.
80. Id.
81. 346 U.S. 427 (1953). The Rodriguez de Quias Court stated that Wilko
was based on suspicion of arbitration as a method of weakening the protections
afforded in the substantive law and thus had fallen out of step with the Court's
current position. Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 481.
82. Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 483.
83. Id. at 481.
84. Id. at 485-86.
85. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
86. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 23.
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C. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.: Supreme
Court Frames the Question
The Court held in Gilmer 7 that disputes between an em-
ployee and employer, arising under federal statutes, were
subject to an arbitration agreement contained in the em-
ployee's securities registration application.88
The issue in Gilmer was whether a claim under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA)39 can be
subjected to compulsory arbitration pursuant to an arbitra-
tion agreement in a securities registration application.90 The
Court held that it could. 9'
After revisiting the strong federal policy in favor of en-
forcing arbitration agreements and the Court's faith in the
arbitration process, 92 the Court stated that "[i]t is by now
clear that statutory claims may be the subject of an arbitra-
tion agreement, enforceable pursuant to the FAA."93
The Gilmer Court also addressed the plaintiff's conten-
tion that the ADEA is designed not just to address individual
87. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
88. Id. at 23. Gilmer was required to register as a securities representative
with the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). Id. The standard NYSE registra-
tion form provided that Gilmer "agree[d] to arbitrate any dispute, claim or con-
troversy" arising between himself and Interstate "that is required to be arbi-
trated under the rules, constitutions or by-laws of the organizations with which
I register." Id. (alteration in original). NYSE Rule 347 requires arbitration of
"[any controversy between a registered representative and any member or
member organization arising out of the employment or termination of employ-
ment of such registered representative." Id. (alteration in original).
89. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988 & Supp. II 1990).
90. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 23.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 24-26. The Court also noted that a strong federal policy favoring
arbitration can be deduced from the FAA language of § 2, which states that
arbitration provisions shall be valid and enforceable except upon the same
grounds that exist for the revocation of any contract, from § 3 which provides
for stays of proceedings in federal district courts when an issue in the proceed-
ings can be referred to arbitration, and in § 4 which provides for orders compel-
ling arbitration when one party has failed to comply with a valid arbitration
agreement. Id.
93. Id. at 26. The Court acknowledged that in recent years it held enforcea-
ble arbitration agreements relating to claims arising under the Sherman Act,
15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7; § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78j(b); the civil provisions of RICO, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968; and § 12(2) of the
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 771(2); see Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/
Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989); Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMa-
hon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth,
Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
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grievances, but also to further important social policies. 94
The Court did not find any inherent inconsistency between
those policies and enforcement of arbitration agreements. 95
Arbitration is equally able to further broader social policies
as is judicial resolution.96 As earlier cases clearly stated,97 if
Congress intended for the ADEA's substantive protection to
include protection from mandatory arbitration, that intention
would be deducible from the legislative history or the text.98
In fact, the ADEA possesses a flexible approach to resolution
of claims that suggests arbitration is consistent with its stat-
utory scheme. 99
The Court also resolved doubts about the adequacy of ar-
bitration as a forum for effective, fair dispute resolution. 100
First, the Court refused to indulge plaintiff's contention that
arbitration panels may be partial, stating that the rules ap-
plicable to the dispute in this case provide protections against
biased panels, and that the FAA itself provides statutory pro-
tection.10 1 Next, the Court refuted plaintiff's argument con-
cerning the adequacy of discovery in arbitration, stating that
the trade-off between procedure and that of efficiency and
simplicity does not affect the forum's adequacy.10 2 Plaintiff's
argument that arbitration will not further the purposes of the
ADEA because it does not provide for broad equitable relief
was not persuasive, because arbitrators do have the power to
fashion equitable relief. 103
Finally, in response to Gilmer's contention that arbitra-
tion agreements related to the ADEA should not be enforced
because there will often be unequal bargaining power be-
tween the employer and employee, the Court stated that
"[m]ere inequality in bargaining power.., is not a sufficient
reason to hold that arbitration agreements are never enforce-
94. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 27-29.
95. Id. at 27-28.
96. Id.
97. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614, 628 (1985).
98. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 29.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 30-32.
101. Id. at 30-31. The FAA provides that courts may overturn arbitration
decisions "[wihere there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators."
9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(2) (1988 & Supp. III 1992).
102. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 31.
103. Id. at 32.
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able in the employment context." 10 4 Such agreements are,
pursuant to the very purpose of the FAA, on the same footing
as other contracts and are enforceable "save upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract."10 5
Gilmer declined to directly address the unresolved ques-
tion of the scope of the FAA's section 1 exclusion because it
was not raised in the courts below, it was not among the
questions presented in the petition for certiorari, and the ar-
bitration clause being enforced before the Court was not in a
contract of employment. 10 6
In his dissent, Justice Stevens opined that the scope of
the section 1 exclusion should be addressed.10 7 He stated
that arbitration clauses contained in employment agree-
ments are specifically exempt from the coverage of the
FAA.108 Justice Stevens relied upon the legislative history of
the Act, which he viewed as clearly indicating that the FAA
was intended to apply solely to commercial arbitration agree-
ments and to mandate a wide-scope interpretation of section
1.109 Stevens also stated that the essential purpose of the
ADEA was frustrated by compulsory arbitration of employ-
ment discrimination claims. 10Gilmer held enforceable an agreement to arbitrate fed-
eral statutory claims between an employee and an employer
pursuant to an arbitration agreement contained in a securi-
ties registration application."' Because the Court did not de-
cide whether such an agreement is enforceable pursuant to
an arbitration agreement directly between the employee and
his or her employer, 112 a split developed in the federal courts.
This split has not been resolved by the Supreme Court.
104. Id. at 32-33.
105. Id. at 33 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1988)).
106. Id. at 25 n.2. The Court stated that Gilmer's arbitration agreement was
not within a contract of employment because it was in a securities registration
agreement, which is a contract with a securities exchange and not Interstate.
Id. However, any disputes between Gilmer and Interstate were subject to this
clause. Id.
107. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 36 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
108. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
109. Id. at 38-41 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
110. Id. at 41-42 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
111. Id. at 23.
112. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 25 n.2.
570 [Vol. 36
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D. The Section 1 Exclusion: Two Distinct Case Lines
1. The Majority Advocates a Narrow-Scope
Interpretation of the Section 1 Exclusion
Many federal courts that have addressed the issue of the
scope of the section 1 exclusion of the FAA have narrowly con-
strued the phrase "any other class of workers engaged in for-
eign or interstate commerce."113 As a result, they have held
that only arbitration clauses in contracts of employment of
those in the transportation industry are exempt from the
FAA. 11 4 In support of this position, various courts have relied
on the Act's legislative history, the strong federal policy
favoring arbitration, and a belief in the arbitration process as
procedurally adequate.
Early decisions relied primarily on the FAA's legislative
history. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in Ten-
ney Engineering v. United Electrical Workers, 1 5 said that to
give meaning to the phrase "workers engaged in foreign or
interstate commerce" 11 6 required the court to determine what
Congress' intent was in 1925 when it drafted such lan-
guage.1 1 7 Quoting the statement of Mr. Andrew Furuseth of
the Seamen's Union, 1 s the court focused on the class of work-
ers in question. Seamen constituted a class of workers for
whom "Congress had long provided machinery for arbitra-
tion."119 The other exempted class, railroad employees, also
had special procedures for the resolution of disputes. 20 Both
of these classes were directly engaged in interstate
commerce.
Thus, the intent of the phrase "any other class of workers
engaged in foreign or interstate commerce" was, under the
rule of "ejusdem generis,"121 to include only those other
113. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
114. Among the federal circuits supporting this view are the first, second,
third, and seventh; see Spellman v. Securities, Annuities and Ins. Serv., Inc., 10
Cal. Rptr. 2d 427, 432 (Ct. App. 1992).
115. 207 F.2d 450 (3d Cir. 1953).
116. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
117. Tenney, 207 F.2d at 452.
118. See supra text accompanying note 29.
119. Tenney, 207 F.2d at 452 n.7.
120. Id. at 452 n.8.
121. Ejusdem generis is a generally accepted rule of statutory construction
that "where general words follow an enumeration of persons or things, by words
of a particular and specific meaning, such general words are not to be construed
in their widest extent, but are to be held as applying only to persons or things of
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classes of workers who are likewise actually engaged in the
movement of interstate or foreign commerce. 122 "The drafts-
men had in mind the two groups of transportation workers as
to which special arbitration legislation already existed and
they rounded out the exclusionary clause by excluding all
other similar classes of workers."123
The employees in Tenney Engineering were engaged in
the production of goods for subsequent sale in interstate com-
merce. While their activities will "undoubtedly affect inter-
state commerce they are not acting directly in the channels of
commerce itself."124 Therefore, they are not a "class of work-
ers engaged in ... interstate commerce" within the meaning
of section 1.125 Numerous other courts followed Tenney
Engineering. 
126
Another lower court case, DiCrisci v. Lyndon Guaranty
Bank,127 expanded on Tenney's reasoning. The DiCrisci court
the same general kind or class as those specifically mentioned." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 517 (6th ed. 1991).
122. Tenney, 207 F.2d at 452.
123. Id. at 452-53.
124. Id. at 453.
125. Id.
126. See, e.g., Bachashiva v. United States Postal Serv., Inc., 859 F.2d 402
(6th Cir. 1988) (stating that postal workers fall within the scope of the § 1 exclu-
sion. The concern is not whether the individual was personally engaged in in-
terstate commerce, but whether the class of workers to which the individual
belonged engaged in interstate commerce.); American Postal Workers Union v.
United States Postal Serv., Inc., 823 F.2d 466 (11th Cir. 1987) ("[Ihf any workers
are actually 'engaged in interstate commerce,'.., postal workers are."); Miller
Brewing Co. v. Brewery Workers Local Union No. 9, 739 F.2d 1159 (7th Cir.
1984) (stating that § 1 is limited to workers engaged in the transportation in-
dustry); Erving v. Virginia Squires Basketball Club, 468 F.2d 1064 (2d Cir.
1972) (holding that a professional basketball player is not closely related
enough to the actual movement of goods in interstate commerce); Dickstein v.
duPont, 443 F.2d 783 (1st Cir. 1971) (holding that an account executive em-
ployed by brokerage firm was not a worker engaged in interstate commerce
within the contemplation of § 1 of the. FAA); Signal-Stat Corp. v. Local 475, 235
F.2d 298 (2d Cir. 1956) (stating that employees engaged in the manufacture of
goods for interstate commerce are not engaged in interstate commerce within
the meaning of the exclusionary clause of § 1); Kropfelder v. Snap-On Tools
Corp., 859 F. Supp. 952 (D. Md. 1994) ("[Plaintiff's relationship with interstate
commerce, while quite substantial, is not sufficiently similar to that of seamen
and railroad workers so as to bring him within the § 1 exemption."); Hull v.
NCR Corp., 826 F. Supp. 303 (E.D. Mo. 1993) ("Because Plaintiff is not a sea-
man, railroad worker, or an employee actually engaged in the movement of in-
terstate or foreign commerce, she is not a member of the 'class of workers' re-
ferred to in the exclusionary clause.").
127. 807 F. Supp. 947 (W.D.N.Y. 1992).
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acknowledged that while at first glance it might seem as
though Congress would have intended "commerce" to have a
uniform meaning throughout the Act, "the reference to 'work-
ers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce' in section 1
would be surplusage if it were simply coextensive with Con-
gress's Commerce Clause power."12 Therefore, because
under Southland Corp.12 9 section 2 gives the entire FAA the
same reach as Congress' Commerce Clause power, if Con-
gress wanted to exclude all employment contracts it could
have just said "employment contracts."130 That is, "[a]ny
workers beyond the reach of the Commerce Clause would not
be covered by the Act in the first place." 131  DiCrisci held
that the language of section 1 supports this view because the
references to "seamen," "railroad employees" and "any other
class of workers engaged in... interstate commerce" suggest
that Congress intended to refer to workers engaged in com-
merce to the same degree as those groups. 132 DiCrisci also
points out that the history behind the addition of the section
1 limitation suggests it may have arisen because of concerns
over certain classes of workers and not employment contracts
in general.133
Generally, courts that rely on the federal policy favoring
arbitration invoke the language of Signal-Stat, which stated
that "[i]n view of the present, almost universal, approval of
arbitration as a means for settling labor disputes... we think
the courts should interpret the [FAA] so as to further, rather
than impede, arbitration in this area."134
Allegations that arbitration is unfair or procedurally de-
ficient are generally refuted with the support of Rodriguez de
Quijas1 3 5 and Mitsubishi Motors Corp. 13 6
128. DiCrisci, 807 F. Supp. at 953.
129. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
130. DiCrisci, 807 F. Supp. at 953.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 953.
133. Id. The § 1 exclusion came about because of the objection of a represen-
tative of the Seamen's Union, who claimed that their contracts came under ad-
miralty jurisdiction and should not be subject to the FAA. Id.; see supra note 26
and accompanying text.
134. Signal-Stat Corp. v. Local 475, 235 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1956).
135. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989);
see supra part II.B.3.
136. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614
(1985); see supra part II.B.1.
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2. A Minority of Jurisdictions Advocate a Wide-Scope
Interpretation of the Section 1 Exclusion
a. Judicial Interpretation
Some courts have interpreted section l's phrase "any
other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate com-
merce" broadly to include all employment contracts. 137 These
courts have relied on the legislative history of the FAA,' 38 in-
terpretation of the Act's use of the word "commerce," and pub-
lic policy regarding the perceived inequality in bargaining
power between employee and employer.13 9
In Willis v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.,14 0 the court ex-
amined the statement of the chairman of the ABA made dur-
ing a hearing of the Senate Judiciary Committee concerning
the drafting of the FAA that the Act "is not intended to be an
act referring to labor disputes at all." 4 ' The court said that
the plain language of section 1, coupled with the description
of its meaning by the chairman of the ABA, "suggests an in-
tent to create a mechanism through which businesses might
agree to resolve disputes without recourse to the courts."' 42
Thus, while the FAA was created to enforce a type of agree-
ment, it limited its scope by creating a category of contracts
not subject to the Act's control.143
Willis also argued that the commerce power supported
an exclusion of all contracts of employment in disputes aris-
ing under Title VII and the ADEA.14  The court reasoned
that based upon Congress' determination in Title VII that
"any employer with 15 or more employees necessarily impli-
cates interstate commerce," any claims that involve employ-
ment contracts with employers subject to Title VII or the
ADEA necessarily implicate interstate commerce.' 45 There-
fore, all employment contracts with employers subject to reg-
137. See generally Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reconsidering the Employment Con-
tract Exclusion in Section 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act: Correcting the Judi-
ciary's Failure of Statutory Vision, 1991 J. Disp. RESOL. 259 (1991).
138. See supra part II.A.
139. Aquino, supra note 1, at 1.
140. 948 F.2d 305 (6th Cir. 1991).
141. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
142. Willis, 948 F.2d at 311.
143. Id.
144. Id. Both Title VII and the ADEA were enacted pursuant to Congress'
commerce power. Id.
145. Id. at 311.
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ulation under a statute enacted pursuant to Congress' com-
merce power fall within the section 1 exclusion.146
b. 'Real Life" Concerns Are Used to Support the
Wide-Scope Interpretation of Section 1
Arguments based upon fears that employees will be
forced into arbitration clauses because of unequal bargaining
power are usually couched in general adhesion contract
terms. 14 7 It is argued by legal commentators and the plain-
tiffs' bar that a plaintiff's Seventh Amendment right to a jury
trial, particularly with respect to federal statutory claims, is
too important a right to be taken away without the party's
full, knowing consent. 148 Because many employers require
their employees to sign arbitration agreements as a condition
of employment, there is little for the employee to do if he or
she wants to work but to sign the agreement. 149 Justice Ste-
vens, in his Gilmer dissent, vigorously supports this conten-
tion, stating that "the exclusion in section 1 should be inter-
preted to cover any agreements by the employee to arbitrate
disputes with the employer arising out of the employment re-
lationship, particularly where such agreements to arbitrate
are conditions of employment."'5 0
Opponents of mandatory arbitration clauses also argue
that full monetary awards will not be available to a prevail-
ing plaintiff.15 1 In particular, arbitrators will rarely award
the full punitive damages that a jury would award. 152 One
reason offered for this is that arbitrators will be more
favorable to the employer because the employer is generally
the party paying the arbitration costs.153 Also, since employ-
146. Id.
147. But see supra text accompanying notes 104-05.
148. See Aquino, supra note 1, at 1; Arbitration Carries Risks for Employees,
SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Dec. 4, 1994, at PC1; Hal Davis, Banks Follow Bro-
kerages: Arbitrate Yes, Litigate No, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 12, 1994, at B1; Nina
Schuyler, As Mandatory Arbitration Use Grows, Securities Industry Faces a
Challenge, S.F. DAILY J., Jan. 12, 1995, at 1.
149. See Schuyler, supra note 148, at 1.
150. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 40 (1991) (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
151. See Arbitration Carries Risks for Employees, supra note 148, at PC1;
Aquino, supra note 1, at 1.
152. See Arbitration Carries Risks for Employees, supra note 148, at PC1;
Aquino, supra note 1, at 1.
153. See Arbitration Carries Risks for Employees, supra note 148, at PC1;
Aquino, supra note 1, at 1.
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ers are often repeat users of arbitration services, the arbitra-
tors will not want to "bite the hand that feeds them."154 That
is, if they award a large sum of punitive damages to an em-
ployee-claimant, the employer will likely go to another arbi-
tration firm the next time it has a dispute. 155
c. The Ninth Circuit's "Knowing Waiver"
Recently, the Ninth Circuit issued a trilogy of cases that
limited the ability of employers to enforce mandatory arbitra-
tion agreements. 156 In its most pointed decision, Prudential
Insurance Co. v. Lai, 5 ' the Ninth Circuit held that a
mandatory arbitration clause contained in the National Asso-
ciation of Securities Dealers' (NASD) U-4 form is not enforce-
able unless the party signing it knowingly waived his or her
federal statutory rights.15 8 The court stated, "Congress in-
tended there to be at least a knowing agreement to arbitrate
employment disputes before an employee may be deemed to
have waived the comprehensive statutory rights, remedies
and procedural protections prescribed in Title VII and related
state statutes." 59 The Lai court noted that the arbitration
form the plaintiffs had signed did not specify which types of
disputes would be arbitrated, nor did they ever receive a copy
of the NASD manual containing the terms of the arbitration
agreement. 60 Though not mentioned in the court's opinion,
both plaintiffs in Lai were recent immigrants with limited
English skills.1
6 1
154. See Arbitration Carries Risks for Employees, supra note 148, at PC1;
Aquino, supra note 1, at 1.
155. Aquino, supra note 1, at 1.
156. The three cases are: Prudential Ins. Co. v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299 (9th Cir.
1994) (holding that employees with limited English ability who signed an agree-
ment containing a vague mandatory arbitration clause had not knowingly
waived their federal statutory rights); Tracer Research Corp. v. National Envtl.
Serv. Co., 42 F.3d 1292 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that a misappropriation of trade
secrets claim was not arbitrable because the arbitration clause contained vague
language); Graham Oil Co. v. ARCO Prod. Co., 43 F.3d 1244 (9th Cir. 1994)
(holding that an arbitration clause could not waive a gas franchisee's rights to
recover punitive damages because these rights were guaranteed by statute).
157. 42 F.3d 1299 (9th Cir. 1994).
158. Lai, 42 F.3d at 1305.
159. Id. at 1304.
160. Id. at 1301.
161. Jorge Aquino, Shifting Sands of Arbitration Arena, RECORDER, Mar. 24,
1995, at 1. Shortly after the Lai decision, San Francisco Superior Court held
that an English speaking employee of Merrill Lynch, who had been registered
with the NASD for 30 years and who had received compensation from his em-
[Vol. 36576
19961 MANDATORY ARBITRATION CLAUSES
III. IDENTIFICATION OF THE PROBLEM
Litigation costs continue to skyrocket, as do the number
of employment-related lawsuits filed each year.162 For these
reasons, it is important for employers to control their litiga-
tion expenses. Requiring employees to arbitrate any employ-
ment-related disputes is one of the best ways to do this. How-
ever, the section 1 exception to the FAA and the resulting
split in authority cast doubt on the enforceability of
mandatory arbitration agreements contained in employment
contracts.
163
For this reason, it is important to analyze the section 1
exclusion as well as the split authority to establish with some
certainty to what extent employers can expect arbitration
agreements to be enforced under the FAA.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. The Drafters of the FAA Intended for the Section 1
Exclusion to be Applied Narrowly
1. The Legislative History
A careful examination of the legislative history of the
FAA indicates that Congress intended for the section 1 em-
ployment contract exclusion to be read narrowly.16 4 That is,
they intended for it to exclude only those employment con-
tracts of seamen, railroad employees, and those engaged in
interstate transportation in a similar fashion.
a. Support for a Narrow Interpretation of the
Section 1 Exclusion
When examining congressional motives behind the em-
ployment contract exclusion in section 1 of the FAA, the nar-
row scope of the exclusion becomes clear. The exclusion was
placed in the FAA to overcome the objection of a representa-
tive of the Seafarers International Union.165 The representa-
tive objected to the bill because admiralty jurisdiction applied
ployer that only a registered employee could have received, was barred from
arguing that he had not knowingly waived his rights in signing a U-4 form.
Brown v. Merrill Lynch, No. 957526 (Cal. Super. Ct., Jan. 25, 1995).
162. See supra notes 1-2.
163. See supra parts II.A, II.D.
164. See infra parts 1V.A.1.a, WV.A.I.b.
165. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
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to seaman's wages 16 6 and because Congress had long ago pro-
vided arbitration machinery for seamen as a class of work-
ers.16 7 To overcome the objection, Congress exempted em-
ployment contracts of seamen and railroad workers (a class of
workers that also had special procedures for dispute resolu-
tion).' 68 Both classes of workers were directly engaged in the
interstate movement of goods.169 Congress rounded out the
exemption by excluding all similar classes of workers, such as
those to whom special dispute resolution procedures already
existed and those who were directly engaged in the interstate
transportation of goods. 17
Congress did not create a wholesale exclusion from the
FAA for employment contracts. Had that been its intent, sec-
tion 1 would simply read, "nothing herein contained shall ap-
ply to contracts of employment." Instead, a small niche was
carved out for certain classes of workers whose employment
disputes were already subject to arbitration. It thereby
achieved its goal of placing all arbitration agreements upon
the same footing as other contracts, while preserving the pre-
existing arbitration mechanisms of seamen, railroad employ-
ees, and other similar classes of workers. Nothing in this his-
tory indicates an intent to exclude all contracts of
employment from the FAA. 17 '
Many of the cases that follow this narrow interpretation
compare the class of workers in question to both seamen and
railroad employees in terms of whether they engaged in in-
terstate commerce in a similar fashion.
1 72
Thus, workers producing goods that merely affect inter-
state commerce are not a class of workers "engaged in inter-
state commerce."' 73 Brewery workers are not a class of work-
166. Report of the Committee on Commerce, Trade and Commercial Law, 48
REP. A.B.A. 287 (1923).
167. See Tenney Eng'g v. United Elec. Workers, 207 F.2d 450, 452 n.7 (3rd
Cir. 1953).
168. Id. at 452 n.8.
169. Id. at 452.
170. Id. at 452-53.
171. It seems that the exclusion came about not because of some wholesale
concern over employment contracts, but because of the particularized concerns
of one or two special interest groups. DiCrisci v. Lyndon Guar. Bank, 807 F.
Supp. 947, 953 (W.D.N.Y. 1992).
172. See infra notes 173-78 and accompanying text.
173. See Tenney Eng'g v. United Elec. Workers, 207 F.2d 450, 452 n.7 (3rd
Cir. 1953).
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ers akin to seamen "engaged in interstate commerce, " 174 nor
is a professional basketball player, 175 nor a brokerage ac-
count executive. 176 Postal workers, however, are a class of
workers engaged in interstate commerce such that the sec-
tion 1 exclusion applies, 177 as are those in the transportation
industry. 178
b. Minority Misinterpretation
Some courts have misinterpreted the legislative history
of the FAA as intending to exclude all arbitration agreements
in employment contracts.
179
In his dissent in Gilmer,180 Justice Stevens addresses the
comments of the chairman of the ABA committee that drafted
the Act.' 8 ' First, Stevens points out that the ABA committee
was instructed to consider and report upon "the further ex-
tension of the principle of commercial arbitration."'82 In par-
ticular, Stevens observes that the committee chairman as-
sured the members of the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee
174. See Miller Brewing Co. v. Brewery Workers Local Union No. 9, 739 F.2d
1159 (7th Cir. 1984) (stating that § 1 is inapplicable because it has been held to
be limited to workers engaged in the transportation industries).
175. See Erving v. Virginia Squires Basketball Club, 468 F.2d 1064 (2d Cir.
1972) (holding that the § 1 exception is generally limited to employees involved
in or closely related to the actual movement of goods in interstate commerce).
176. See Dickstein v. duPont, 443 F.2d 783 (1st Cir. 1971) (stating that an
account executive employed by a brokerage firm is not a "worker engaged in
interstate or foreign commerce" within the contemplation of 9 U.S.C. § 1).
177. See Bachashiva v. United States Postal Serv., 859 F.2d 402 (6th Cir.
1988) ('[If any class of workers is engaged in interstate commerce it is postal
workers"); American Postal Workers Union v. United States Postal Serv., 823
F.2d 466 (11th Cir. 1987) ("[Postal workers] are responsible for dozens, if not
hundreds of items of mail moving in 'interstate commerce' on a daily basis. In-
deed, without them, interstate commerce as we know it today would scarcely be
possible."). But see Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reconsidering the Employment Contract
Exclusion in Section 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act: Correcting the Judiciary's
Failure of Statutory Vision, 1991 J. DiSP. RESOL. 259, 265 (1991) ("[Mluch of the
letter carrier's work is purely local or intrastate and can hardly be said to have
entered the stream of interstate commerce merely because the postal system as
a whole is important to commerce.").
178. See Rosen v. Trans-X Ltd., 816 F. Supp. 1364 (D. Minn. 1993) (holding
that truck drivers are members of a "class of workers engaged in interstate
commerce" even though individual driver's employment with the employer may
not have taken him across state lines).
179. See supra part II.D.2.
180. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991) (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
181. Id. at 38-41 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
182. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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during hearings on the bill that the bill "is not intended to be
an act referring to labor disputes at all. It is purely an act to
give the merchants the right or the privilege of sitting down
and agreeing with each other as to what their damages are, if
they want to do it." 183
Stevens also cites the statement of Senator Walsh, indi-
cating that employment contracts are generally contracts of
adhesion, and thus it is not fair to force the individual to sur-
render his right to a judicial tribunal.18 4
From these two sources, Stevens draws the conclusion
that the FAA was specifically intended to exclude arbitration
agreements between employees and employers.1 5
While the ABA did instruct its committee to further the
principle of commercial arbitration, when this principle is
placed alongside section 2 of the FAA' 86 and the general prin-
ciple that the purpose of the FAA was to make arbitration
agreements as valid and enforceable as other contracts,18 7
the ABA's instruction should be properly interpreted as sup-
porting the extension of the principle of commercial arbitra-
tion to all arbitration provisions in any contract involving
commerce. Therefore, any contract of employment not sub-
ject to the narrow section 1 exclusion can contain a valid, en-
forceable arbitration agreement.
Particularly when one notes that Stevens' main support
rests on his belief that arbitration is an inferior forum and on
Senator Walsh's classification of employment contracts as
contracts of adhesion,8 8 does the weakness of Steven's posi-
tion surface. For at least the past ten years, the Supreme
Court has maintained that "we are well past the time when
judicial suspicion of the desirability of arbitration and the
183. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
184. Senator Walsh states:
The trouble about the matter is that a great many of these con-
tracts that are entered into are really not [voluntary] things at all....
A man says "these are our terms. All right, take it or leave it." Well,
there is nothing for the man to do except to sign it; and then he surren-
ders his right to have his case tried by the court, and has to have it
tried before a tribunal in which he has no confidence at all.
Hearings on S. 4213 and S. 4214 Before the Subcomm. on the Judiciary, 67th
Cong., 4th Sess. 9 (1923).
185. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 38-41 (1991)
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
186. See supra notes 19-25 and accompanying text.
187. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
188. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 38-41 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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competence or arbitral tribunals inhibited the development of
arbitration as an alternative means of dispute resolution."1"9
The majority in Gilmer embraced this position. 190
The Gilmer majority also dismissed Senator Walsh's ad-
hesion argument, stating that "mere inequality in bargaining
power is not a sufficient reason to hold that arbitration agree-
ments are never enforceable in the employment context."191
The FAA itself states that arbitration agreements in gen-
eral are enforceable except upon grounds for revocation of
any contract. 192 Thus, arguments based on the perceived un-
fitness of the arbitral forum and on adhesion contract princi-
ples have long since dissipated.
Following Senator Walsh and Justice Stevens' rationale
would result in holding that an arbitration agreement in any
employment contract or any commercial contract would be in-
herently void because of unequal bargaining power, regard-
less of the reality of the situation. 193 This would seem incon-
sistent with the FAA's intent of making arbitration
agreements as valid and enforceable as any contract. 
194
The Willis court states that the FAA's legislative history
indicates an intent to enforce a certain type of agreement
while excluding another, namely arbitration agreements in
contracts of employment. 195 This conclusion is reached by
reading the ABA drafting committee chairman's statement
that the FAA is not intended to refer to labor disputes 196 in
conjunction with the plain language of the FAA's section 1
exclusion. 197
To do so, however, would ignore the rest of the legislative
history discussed above, particularly as to why the exclusion
was included. Originally, there was no section 1 exclusion in
the FAA. It was only after a certain, single special interest
group lobbied to be excluded that the section 1 exclusion
189. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,
626-27 (1985).
190. See supra text accompanying notes 100-03.
191. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 32-33.
192. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
193. See supra notes 183-85 and accompanying text.
194. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
195. Willis v. Dean Witter Reynolds, 948 F.2d 305, 311 (5th Cir. 1991).
196. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
197. "[N]othing herein contained shall apply to contracts of employment of
seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or
interstate commerce." 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
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came about.198 If the intent was to exclude all employment
contracts, as the Willis court believes, 199 then Congress
would have so indicated. Instead, they specifically limited
the type of employment contracts to which the FAA applies:
seamen, railroad employees, and other similar types of work-
ers engaged in interstate commerce in a similar way are ex-
empt.20 0 By analogy, if trucking were as popular and efficient
a measure of transporting interstate goods in 1923 as ships
and trains, it would likely have been enumerated as well.201
2. The Use of the Term "Commerce" in the FAA
Supports a Narrow-Scope Interpretation
The wording of the section 1 exclusion also indicates an
intent of the drafters to exclude only certain classes of work-
ers actually engaged in interstate commerce in an enumer-
ated manner.20 2
Section 2 of the FAA gave the Act the same reach as Con-
gress' commerce power.203 Had Congress intended for the
word "commerce" to have the same meaning throughout the
Act, the wording of section 1 would be redundant if it was
simply coextensive with Congress' powers under the Com-
merce Clause.20 4 Had Congress intended to exclude all con-
tracts of employment, it would simply have said "contracts of
employment" in section 1.205 It did not. Rather, Congress
utilized language that indicates they intended to exclude two
certain types of employment contracts and those other classes
198. See supra notes 165-70 and accompanying text.
199. Willis v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 948 F.2d 305, 311 (6th Cir. 1991).
200. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1988). See Tenney Eng'g v. United Elec. Workers, 207
F.2d 450, 452-53 (3rd Cir. 1953).
201. To allow the intentionally narrow § 1 exclusion to apply to all employ-
ment contracts would be to allow the exception to swallow the rule. The § 1
exclusion was not added to the FAA because Congress intended to exclude all
arbitration agreements in employment contracts. It was included simply to ap-
pease one specific union.
202. See supra parts II.D.1, IV.A.1.
203. The "involving commerce" requirement in § 2 is not a limitation on the
power of the federal courts but a necessary qualification on a statute intended
to apply in state and federal courts. As an exercise of the federal Commerce
Clause power, the FAA creates' a body of federal substantive law applicable in
federal and state courts. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10-15 (1983).
204. DiCrisci v. Lyndon Guar. Bank, 807 F. Supp. 947, 953 (W.D.N.Y. 1992).
205. Id.
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of workers engaged in interstate commerce in the same
way. 20 6
Some courts have argued that all employment contracts
with employers subject to regulation under Title VII or the
ADEA fall under the section 1 exclusion.20 7 Such courts rea-
son that because Title VII and the ADEA were enacted pur-
suant to Congress' commerce power, and because Congress
determined in Title VII that any employer with fifteen or
more employees necessarily implicates interstate commerce,
any claims involving employment contracts with employers
subject to regulation under Title VII or the ADEA necessarily
implicate interstate commerce. 20 8 Thus, all employment con-
tracts with employers subject to regulation under acts of Con-
gress designed to protect employees from unlawful discrimi-
nation and enacted pursuant to Congress' commerce power
fall within the exclusion.209
This reasoning, however, fails to take into consideration
why Congress decided to strictly limit its language in section
1. Had the original intent been to exclude all employment
contracts, Congress would not have singled out certain spe-
cific classes of workers, rather than simply using a general
statement such as "nothing herein shall apply to contracts of
employment."210
Most importantly, such arguments ignore the fact that
Title VII and the ADEA specifically do not disallow arbitra-
tion within their text or legislative history.21' Were Con-
206. Id.
207. See Willis v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 948 F.2d 305, 311 (6th Cir.
1991).
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. See supra note 200. Southland held that the FAA's reach was coexten-
sive with Congress' commerce power. Thus, a simple exclusion of "contracts of
employment" would have excluded from the FAA all arbitration agreements in
employment contracts that affect interstate commerce. Specifically enumerat-
ing a certain class of workers would indicate an intent of Congress to exclude
significantly less than all employment contracts from the coverage of the FAA.
211. See infra part V.C. In light of the strong federal policy favoring arbi-
tration, "having made the bargain to arbitrate, the party should be held to it
unless Congress itself has evinced an intention to preclude a waiver of judicial
remedies for the statutory rights at issue." Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985). The party challenging the
arbitration agreement has the burden of proving that Congress intended to pre-
clude a waiver of a judicial forum for the statutory claims in question. Gilmer
v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 29 (1991).
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gress' intent to preclude arbitration under Title VII, such in-
tent would be deducible from the Act itself.212 It is not.
Section 2 applies the FAA coextensively with the Commerce
Clause power.213 Thus, any limitation Congress intended to
extend to the entire reach of the Act would not need further
restrictions such as the section 1 exclusion contains. The sec-
tion 1 exclusion was therefore meant to apply only to a nar-
rowly defined class of workers and not to employment con-
tracts generally.
B. General Policy Supports the Narrow-Scope
Interpretation of the FAA's Legislative History
There are numerous policy arguments that lend support
to an interpretation of Congress' intent to apply the section 1
exclusion narrowly.
1. The Purpose of the FAA Was to Reverse Judicial
Hostility Toward Arbitration
First, the FAA's recognized purpose was to reverse long-
standing judicial hostility to arbitration agreements that ex-
isted under English common law.214 This is likely the same
type of hostility Justice Stevens clings to in his dissent in Gil-
mer.21 5 While some rely upon this hostility as a basis for
their arguments,21 6 they ignore the fact that the whole pur-
pose of the FAA was to overcome the very basis of their
arguments.
2. Congress Enacted the FAA to Place Arbitration
Agreements on the Same Footing as Other
Contracts
The FAA also sought to place arbitration agreements
upon the same footing as other contracts. 21 This position,
supported on the very face of section 2 of the FAA,21 8 shows a
212. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,
628 (1985).
213. See supra note 203.
214. See supra note 20.
215. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 36 (1991) (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting).
216. Id. See, e.g., Aquino, supra note 1, at 1; Arbitration Carries Risk for
Employees, supra note 148, at PC1.
217. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 24.
218. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
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strong faith in arbitration. The message is clear: such agree-
ments are as enforceable as any commercial contract. When
Congress' very purpose in enacting the FAA was to place
faith and strength in arbitration agreements, it is counterin-
tuitive that some subsequently attempt to say that Congress
believed in the value of arbitration agreements in every con-
ceivable commercial situation except one: employment con-
tracts. A more plausible explanation is that Congress in-
tended for all arbitration agreements to be as enforceable as
other contracts, with one exception for a narrowly defined
class of workers for whom labor arbitration already
existed.219
By creating such a broad federal scheme, Congress has
been interpreted as intending to create a universal body of
federal substantive law of arbitrability applicable to any arbi-
tration agreement within the coverage of the Act.22 ° Incon-
sistent state laws could no longer undermine the enforceabil-
ity of arbitration agreements. 221 Thus, the expectations of
those whose contracts involve interstate commerce are both
protected and predictable.222 Since each state has its own
rules regarding the enforceability of arbitration clauses in
employment contracts,223 great inconsistency would result,
both thwarting Congress' intent and opening the door to fo-
rum shopping.
Congress intended, by creating the FAA, to achieve im-
portant goals such as reversing judicial hostility,224 creating
a substantive federal body of arbitration law,225 preserving
expectations,226 and foreclosing state attempts to undermine
arbitration agreements.227 To allow some to rely on argu-
ments not supported by generally recognized congressional
219. See supra part IV.A.1.
220. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24
(1983).
221. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 13 (1983).
222. Id.
223. The California Arbitration Act, CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1280-1294
(West 1982 & Supp. 1995), is representative of many state's arbitration laws.
Unlike the FAA, the California Arbitration Act contains no exclusion for any
type for employment contracts. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.
224. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
225. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
226. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
227. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
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intent to block important objectives would be inefficient at
best and, at worst, unjust.
C. Arbitration is an Adequate Forum for the Disposition of
Federal Statutory Claims228
The recent discussion over the propriety of compulsory
arbitration in employment contracts, particularly with re-
spect to claims based upon statutory rights, has been cen-
tered not in the courtroom but in the legal and mainstream
press.29 Arbitration is so accepted by the judiciary that ar-
guments relating to its fitness are no longer accepted by fed-
eral courts.23 0 Despite the Supreme Court's position, critics
continuously resurrect their distrust of arbitration as a vehi-
cle for attacking mandatory arbitration clauses in employ-
ment contracts.
As early as 1983, the Supreme Court declared that the
FAA manifests a "liberal federal policy favoring arbitra-
tion."23 1 The federal substantive law that governs arbitration
agreements requires "that questions of arbitrability must be
addressed with a healthy regard for the federal policy favor-
ing arbitration.., and any doubts concerning the scope of
228. This section does not attempt to fully evaluate the adequacy of
arbitration in general. Rather, this section examines the recent criticism
leveled at mandatory arbitration clauses in employment contracts by
addressing their arguments, particularly in light of the Supreme Court's
position in favor of arbitration.
229. See, e.g., Arbitration Carries Risks for Employees, supra note 148, at
PCI; Aquino, supra note 1, at 1; Jorge Aquino, Revamping Employment Arbi-
tration, RECORDER, Aug. 4, 1994, at 1 [hereinafter Revamping]; Peter
Blackman, Defending Arbitration, N.Y. L.J., July 14, 1994, at 5; Davis, supra
note 148, at B1. But see supra part II.D.2.c.
230. See, e.g., Willis v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 948 F.2d 305, 309-10 (6th
Cir. 1991). Relying upon the Supreme Court's rationale in Mitsubishi and Gil-
mer, the Willis court rejected the plaintiff's argument that arbitration is an
inappropriate forum for the disposition of federal statutory discrimination
claims. "[S]o long as the prospective litigant may vindicate [his or her] statu-
tory cause of action in the arbitral forum, the statute will continue to serve both
its remedial and deterrent function." Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 (1985).
231. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24
(1983). With a recent study showing that the 281,740 cases filed in the year
ending June 30, 1994 are expected to balloon to over one million cases per year
by 2020, the judiciary's preference for arbitration most likely will not change.
See Randall Samborn, Judge's Foresee Federal Courts Caseload Crush, NAT'L
L.J., Jan. 9, 1995, at 1.
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arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of
arbitration."232
Once this federal policy is recognized, and once it is es-
tablished that employment contracts fall within the scope of
the FAA,233 the issue should be entirely resolved. There is no
provision in the FAA stipulating that claims based upon fed-
eral statutory rights are exempt.234 Nor is this position al-
luded to by the drafters' intent.23 5 Should the legislature
wish to amend federal statutes to make them exempt from
arbitration, the proper federal statutes should be so
amended.23 6
Still, legal commentators and plaintiff attorneys continue
to allege that plaintiffs' rights will not be adequately vindi-
cated in arbitration.2 37 Simply because the party agreed to
arbitrate a statutory claim, however, does not mean that
party forfeits the substantive rights afforded by the statute;
that party only agrees to a resolution in a different forum.23 8
The plaintiff is not being asked to agree not to bring claims
under Title VII. Rather, the party is asked to honor its agree-
ment to trade the procedures and opportunity for review of
the courtroom for the simplicity, informality, expedition, and
lowered cost of arbitration.23 9 Thus, the Ninth Circuit's over-
zealous protection of those plaintiffs required to arbitrate fed-
eral statutory claims is both misplaced and out of step with
current Supreme Court doctrine.24 °
232. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 460 U.S. at 24.
233. See supra part IV.A.1.
234. As stated, the only exclusion in the FAA is that for "contracts of employ-
ment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in
foreign or interstate commerce." 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
235. See supra part IV.A.1.a.
236. In fact, Senator Russell Feingold, D-Wis., introduced the Protection
From Coercive Employment Agreements Act in the spring of 1994, that would
amend The Civil Rights Act of 1964, the ADEA, the Americans with Disabilities
Act of 1990 (ADA), and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 to make it illegal to make
the submission of such claims to mandatory arbitration a condition of hiring,
continued employment, or compensation of an individual. S. 2012, 103d Cong.,
2d Sess. (1994). No further action was taken and Feingold reintroduced the bill
as the Civil Rights Procedures Protection Act of 1995. S. 2271, 104th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1995).
237. See sources cited supra note 229.
238. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,
628 (1985).
239. Id.
240. See supra part II.D.2.c.
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The federal policy favoring arbitration is so strong that it
is assumed that if Congress intended the substantive protec-
tion afforded by a given statute to include protection against
waiver of the right to a judicial forum, that intention would
be deducible from text or legislative history.24 1 If the party
agreed to arbitrate, he or she should be held to that agree-
ment unless Congress has itself expressly manifested an in-
tention to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the statu-
tory rights at issue.242 Courts have found nothing in the text
or legislative history of such heavily litigated federal statutes
as Title VII,2 43 the ADEA,244 the Securities Act of 1933,245
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,246 RICO,247 or the Sher-
man Act 248 that would indicate an intent to preclude arbitra-
tion of such claims.
Plaintiff attorneys and legal commentators argue that
arbitration will rarely afford the plaintiff the full monetary
recovery available in court.249 Arbitrators, however, often
have the power to award punitive damages when the claim is
based upon federal law. 250 There is nothing in the FAA that
expressly prohibits arbitrators from awarding punitive dam-
ages. Therefore, if the federal statute in question allows
them, the arbitrator will be permitted to award punitive dam-
ages. 281 Generally, arbitrators have the ability to award
claimants the same substantive relief as is available in fed-
eral court.252
241. See supra text accompanying notes 50-53 and 97-99.
242. See supra text accompanying notes 50-53 and 97-99.
243. See Willis v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 948 F.2d 305 (6th Cir. 1991).
244. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
245. See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477
(1989).
246. See Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
247. Id.
248. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614 (1985).
249. See sources cited supra note 229.
250. The Supreme Court recently held that punitive damages are recover-
able in arbitration proceedings, even when the state law governing the arbitra-
tion agreement precluded them. Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton,
Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1212 (1995); see, e.g., Stuart H. Bompey & Michael P. Pappas,
Compulsory Arbitration of Employment Claims After Gilmer, 19 EMPLOYEE REL.
L.J. 197, 208-10 (1993-1994).
251. Bompey & Pappas, supra note 250, at 208-10.
252. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 29 (1991).
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It is often argued that arbitration is more favorable to
employers in terms of the outcome.253 Studies are split and
inconclusive on this subject. Some support the plaintiff's
view that awards favor the employer.254 Other studies have
found that employees actually fare better.255 We are in an
age where the average jury verdict for a prevailing plaintiff in
an employment action is reported at $647,000,256 where a
Texas jury recently awarded a wrongfully terminated man-
ager $124 million,257 and where State Farm Insurance set-
tled a sex discrimination class action for $157 million.258 In
this light, any argument that criticizes arbitration because it
awards smaller amounts of money to prevailing plaintiffs in
reality seems to expose the fact that the amount of punitive
damages presently being awarded is out of control.
Many management-side attorneys concede that the arbi-
tration process may actually favor the plaintiff.259 First, ar-
bitrators are not bound by the Federal Rules of Evidence, nor
are they bound by the formal procedures of the court.260
Therefore, the plaintiff can submit arguments and evidence
in arbitration that would not be allowed in a federal court
because they lack legal merit.261 Arbitrators often are more
concerned with issues of basic fairness and are more likely to
give the claimant some award even where no violation of the
law has occurred.262 Second, the statute of limitations may
be circumvented through the use of arbitration.263 Third,
there is no risk of the plaintiff's claims being dismissed for
failure to state a claim or summary judgment.264 Thus, it is
possible for a claimant to prevail in an arbitration when that
same case would never make it to trial in federal court.
It is also argued that arbitrators are more likely to be
lenient toward employers because employers are the ones
253. See sources cited supra note 229.
254. Bompey & Pappas, supra note 250, at 208.
255. Blackman, supra note 229, at 5.
256. Paul S. McDonough, ADR for Labor Disputes: An Idea Whose Time Has
Come, CORP. LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 1994, at 25.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Blackman, supra note 229, at 5.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Bompey & Pappas, supra note 250, at 211.
263. Blackman, supra note 229, at 5.
264. Id.
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paying for the arbitration procedure. 265 The theory is that
the arbitrator will sympathize with the party who signs its
check.266 If the arbitrator awards large punitive damages
against a major client, it is argued that client will most likely
use a different arbitration firm next time.267
The FAA itself protects against this type of occurrence by
allowing courts to overturn arbitration decisions "[w]here
there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitra-
tors."268 In addition, some forms of arbitration allow for a
panel of three arbitrators, with the third being a neutral
party.269 This system cuts down on both real and perceived
bias considerably. Some major commercial arbitration firms
are also revamping their rules to make it easier to disqualify
arbitrators for potential conflicts of interest.2 7 °
Finally, another popular criticism of mandatory arbitra-
tion clauses is just that: they are mandatory. 271 That is, the
employee has no opportunity, generally, to negotiate the
terms of such a clause. The employee signs it and takes the
job or looks elsewhere for employment. It has been contended
that such a clause must be consented to for it to be enforcea-
ble.2 7 2 If a party signs a contract, that person necessarily
consents to all of its terms under the most basic tenets of con-
tract law. If it was required that all terms in all commercial
agreements be negotiated by both parties and their attorneys
prior to accepting the terms, it is likely business would be
greatly hindered. Adhesion contracts are entered by most
people on a daily basis. There is nothing illicit about these
agreements simply because they are nonconsensual.273
265.' Private arbitration procedures can cost upwards of $9000, while the av-
erage bill to defend a suit in court can exceed $90,000. See Aquino, supra note
1, at 1.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(2) (1988).
269. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 30 (1991). The
New York Stock Exchange arbitration rules require that the parties be in-
formed of the employment histories of the arbitrators and that they be allowed
to further inquire into the arbitrator's background. Id. Also, each party is al-
lowed one peremptory challenge and unlimited challenges for cause. Id. Fi-
nally, arbitrators are required to divulge any circumstances which might pre-
clude them from rendering an impartial and objective decision. Id.
270. Revamping, supra note 229, at 1.
271. Davis, supra note 148, at B1.
272. Id.
273. Id.
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The Supreme Court in Gilmer stated that mere inequal-
ity in bargaining power is not a sufficient reason to hold that
arbitration agreements are never enforceable in an employ-
ment contract.2 74 As stated above, the purpose of the FAA
was to place arbitration agreements upon the same footing as
other contracts,275 and thus arbitration agreements are en-
forceable "save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity
for the revocation of any contract."276
Ultimately, opponents of arbitration argue that arbitra-
tion clauses in employment contracts should be elevated to a
level above normal commercial arbitration clauses, so that
they must be specifically consented to and thereby are no
longer on the same footing as other contracts. Congress has
spoken on the subject. The Supreme Court has spoken on the
subject. Until Congress or the Supreme Court decides to
change its position, arbitration clauses should be enforced
like any other contract. Arbitration clauses in employment
contracts are binding on their parties.
V. PROPOSAL
A. The Federal Arbitration Act Should Be Amended to
Remove the Section 1 Exclusion
As long as section 1 of the FAA contains an exclusion for
"contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or
any other class of workers engaged in interstate com-
merce," 277 courts and commentators will continue to use it as
a tool to misconstrue the intent of Congress in implementing
the Act.2 78 Removing the doubt cast over the use of the FAA
to enforce mandatory arbitration clauses in employment con-
tracts will not only protect the expectations of multistate em-
ployers, but it will help unstick the logjam of employment-
related litigation in the court system.
Due to the constantly increasing caseload overwhelming
the federal judiciary,279 particularly with respect to employ-
274. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 33 (1991).
275. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
276. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1988).
277. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
278. See discussion supra part IV.A.1.
279. See supra notes 2 and 231.
591
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
ment discrimination claims,28 ° the need for arbitration of em-
ployment-related disputes will continue to grow. In light of
this fact, and the Supreme Court's overwhelming support of
arbitration,28 ' the logical solution is to amend section 1 of the
FAA.
Section 1 of the FAA should be amended so as to remove
the exclusion for "contracts of employment of seamen, rail-
road employees, or any other class of workers engaged in for-
eign or interstate commerce."282
This exclusion was added to the FAA, as noted above, to
overcome the objections of one single union.2 8 The exclusion
no longer serves the purpose for which it was intended, but
rather has created a loophole that the plaintiff bar has at-
tempted to exploit in order to extract larger punitive damages
from sympathetic juries. 84 This was not Congress' intent.285
Eliminating the section 1 exclusion will serve to effec-
tively close this loophole and achieve Congress' intent of plac-
ing all arbitration agreements on the same footing as other
contracts.286
Should the legislature determine at some point that the
objectives of some federal statute will not be effectuated by an
arbitral forum,28 7 then such federal statute, as the Supreme
280. There were 20 times more employment discrimination cases filed in
1990 than in 1970. According to the Bureau of National Affairs, almost 88,000
charges of employment discrimination were filed with the EEOC during 1993.
This represents a 20% increase over 1992. David R. Barclay & William A.
Carmell, Benefits of a Resolution-Centered ADR Program, CoRP. LEGAL TIMES,
Dec. 1994, at 24.
281. See supra parts II.B, II.C.
282. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1988). As amended, § 1 would read:
§ 1. "Maritime transactions" and "commerce" defined
"Maritime transactions", as herein defined, means charger parties,
bills of lading of water carriers, agreements relating to wharfage, sup-
plies furnished vessels or repairs to vessels, collisions, or any other
matters in foreign commerce which, if the subject of controversy, would
be embraced within admiralty jurisdiction; "commerce", as herein de-
fined, means commerce among the several States or with foreign na-
tions, or in any Territory of the United States or in the District of Co-
lumbia and any State or Territory or foreign nation.
283. See supra notes 165-70 and accompanying text.
284. See supra notes 255-58 and accompanying text.
285. See discussion supra part IV.A.I.
286. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
287. See supra notes 241-48 and accompanying text.
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Court indicated, can be amended to exclude the choice of arbi-
tration as a forum.28 8
B. Until the FAA Is Amended, Employers Should Continue
to Include Mandatory Arbitration Clauses in
Employment Contracts
In light of the fact that the weight of authority, even in
such an unsettled area, rests heavily on the side of enforcing
mandatory arbitration agreements in employment con-
tracts,28 9 employers should continue to include such clauses
in employment contracts offered to their employees.29 °
To be safe, the employment contract should be drafted so
as to more clearly effectuate a knowing waiver of the employ-
ees right to bring his federal statutory claims in court.291
This is essential for those employers operating in the Ninth
Circuit.292 When it is clearly evident that the employee has
knowingly agreed to bring his federal statutory claims in an
arbitral forum, even opponents of mandatory arbitration are
more likely to find it acceptable.29 3
288. A party should be held to its agreement to arbitrate unless Congress
has shown an intention to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for statutory
rights at issue. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473
U.S. 614, 628 (1985).
289. See discussion supra part IV.
290. To illustrate how commonplace such a practice has become, the law firm
of Kincaid, Gianunzio, Caudle & Hubert, on the advice of its outside labor coun-
sel, recently told its more than 100 employees that they must sign a mandatory
arbitration agreement. Nina Schuyler, Kincaid, on Outside Advice, Requires
Arbitration Form, DAILY J., Dec. 21, 1994, at 2. For a discussion of various
methods of presenting the arbitration agreement, see Todd H. Thomas, Using
Arbitration to Avoid Litigation, 1993 LAB. L.J. 3, 14-16.
291. For example, the arbitration clause may be printed in bold type or set
off in a box; it may require the employee to sign his/her initials next to it; and/or
it may specifically list any statutory remedies the party is forgoing. But see Bell
v. Congress Mortgage Co., 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 205 (Ct. App. 1994), where the Cali-
fornia Court of Appeals held that mandatory arbitration clauses in contracts
must be highlighted, in bold type, or accompanied by check-off boxes, or they
would be unenforceable. However, under pressure from banking and employer
groups, the California Supreme Court depublished the case. See also Barbara
Steuart, Court Depublishes Controversial ADR Opinion, RECORDER, July 29,
1994, at 1.
292. See supra part II.D.2.c.
293. See supra notes 271-73 and accompanying text.
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VI. CONCLUSION
It is imperative that mandatory arbitration clauses in
employment contracts be enforced with the same vigor as any
commercial contract. Both the overloaded federal judiciary
as well as the high costs of litigation require that such an
alternate method of dealing with employment disputes be
utilized.
By clearing up the continued confusion over the scope of
the section 1 exclusion and the misplaced, antiquated con-
cerns over the adequacy of the arbitral forum, we will be able
to open the way for more usage of arbitration.
The FAA was intended to place all arbitration agree-
ments on the same footing as other contracts. The exception
in section 1 was included to appease one union, not to exempt
all employment contracts. Only by amending the FAA to re-
move the section 1 exemption can Congress' intent be fully
realized.
Criticisms of the adequacy of the arbitral forum are
based on sensationalized notions instead of realistic concerns.
The judiciary has long since proclaimed its faith in arbitra-
tion. It is time that the plaintiff bar accepted this.
R. James Filiault*
* The author would like to thank his wife, Giselle, for her encouragement
and support.
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